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Variances and Parcel Rezoning:
Relief from Restrictive Zoning
in Nebraska
I. INTRODUCTION
Zoning ordinances restrict the use of property in order to
achieve and promote the goals of a city or county in protecting the
public health, safety and welfare.' These ordinances include vari-
ous use, density, bulk and other restrictions. As contemporary so-
ciety controls development in this manner, conflicts inevitably
arise between private property interests and the broad societal
goals reflected in zoning legislation. 2 Zoning restrictions are of
particular concern to landowners and those involved with the ac-
quisition of real estate. If an acquiring entity meets the requisite
1. C. WILLAMS & D. SHANEYFELT, LAND USE AND THE LAW: A NEBRASKA PRIMER
39 (1977):
It is generally agreed that: (1) zoning legislation is an exercise of the
police power; (2) it is a legislative act by a governing body; (3) it is
valid only if adopted for the public welfare; (4) it must be reasonable
in its regulation in order to be valid; and (5) whether or not a zoning
ordinance is reasonable depends upon the circumstances in each
case.
Id.
2. For example, the following language appears as the preamble of the newly
amended comprehensive zoning ordinance in Lincoln, Nebraska:
Purpose. This title has been made in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan and to promote health and the general welfare of the
community. It is designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to se-
cure safety from fire, flood, and other dangers; to provide adequate
light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue
concentration of population; and to facilitate the adequate provision
of transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks, and other public re-
quirements. These regulations have been made with reasonable con-
sideration, among other things, to the character of the district and its
suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the
value of property and encouraging the most appropriate use of land
throughout the City of Lincoln and the area within three miles
thereof.
LINCOLN, NEB., CODE § 27.01.010 (1979). See NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-401 (Reissue
1977) (cities of the metropolitan class); id. § 15-902 (Reissue 1977) (cities of
the primary class); id. § 19-901 (Reissue 1977) (villages, cities of the first and
second class).
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standing requirements,3 like the private property owner it has judi-
cial or administrative recourse in those situations where it may be
unjustifiably harmed by application of a zoning ordinance. Ave-
nues of relief typically include: (1) a challenge to the constitution-
ality of the regulation;4 (2) a petition to the local legislative body
requesting rezoning or an amendment to the respective ordi-
nance;5 or (3) administrative relief by a petition for a special ex-
ception, a special permit, or a variance. 6
This comment will discuss avenues of relief from a Nebraska
perspective, focusing primarily on the specific requirements and
considerations under Nebraska law with respect to variances and
parcel rezoning.
II. VARIANCES IN NEBRASKA
A variance may be defined as an authorization for a property
owner to use his land or property in a manner contrary to the ex-
press requirements of a zoning ordinance.7 It is, in effect, "a li-
cense to violate the law.'" 8 Variances are generally allowed where
3. As a general rule, one who is merely negotiating a purchase lacks standing.
For a discussion of standing requirements, see notes 39-43 & accompanying
text infra.
4. A challenge might be based upon the legislative body's lack of power to adopt
the relevant ordinance, or upon an assertion of improper enactment. These
issues, however, are beyond the scope of this comment.
5. See § II of text infra.
6. See § I of text infra.
7. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 7 (1966); A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZON-
ING AND PLANNING (4th ed. 1975); 6 P. RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CON-
TROLS § 43 (1978); 2 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAw AND PRACTICE § 15-5 (3d ed. 1965);
Arneberg, Variances in Zoning, 24 U. KAN. Crry L REV. 240 (1956); Bryden,
The Impact of Variances: A Study of Statewide Zoning, 61 MNm. L. REV. 769
(1977); Dallstream & Hunt, Variances, Exceptions and Special Uses, 1954 U.
ILL. L.F. 213; Ford, Guidelines for Judicial Review in Zoning Variance Cases,
58 MAss. L.Q. 15 (1973); Gaylord, Zoning: Variances, Exceptions and Condi-
tional Use Permits in California, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 179 (1958); Green, The
Power of the Zoning Board of Adjustment to Grant Variances from the Zon-
ing Ordinances, 29 N.C. I- REV. 245 (1951); Reps, Discretionary Powers of the
Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAw & CONTEam. PROB. 280 (1955); Rosenzweig,
From Euclid to Eastlake-Toward a Unified Approach to Zoning Change Re-
quests, 82 DICK. L. REV. 59 (1977); Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power-Con-
structive in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L, REV. 3 (1969); Comment,
The General Welfare, Welfare Economics, and Zoning Variances, 38 S. CAL. L
REV. 548 (1965); Comment, Variances in New York- A Trend Toward Flexibil-
ity, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 628 (1969); Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARv. L, REV.
1396 (1961); Note, Variance Administration in Indiana-Problems and Reme-
dies, 48 IND. L.J. 240 (1973); Note, Zoning Variances: The "Unnecessary Hard-
ship" Rule, 8 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85 (1956).
8. ABA Committee on Planning and Zoning of Section of Local Government
Law and Committee on Public Regulation of Land Use of Section of Real
Property Law, Probate and Trust Law (Report), Zoning Variance Criteria-
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the particular use or structure is not inconsistent with the public
interest, and where strict enforcement of the relevant ordinance
would result in unwarranted harm to the property owner.9 The
standard most often referred to in this regard is that of "unneces-
sary hardship."' 0
Some individuals have asserted that the primary purpose of the
variance is "to benefit the community and the individual property
owner by assuring that property capable of being put to commer-
cial, industrial, or residential use will not lie idle."" It is said that
Viewpoints f Lawyers, 8 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST J. 33 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Committee Report].
9. The following is a list of requirements popularly cited as prerequisites to the
granting of a variance:
(1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return if used only
for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is
due to unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the
neighborhood which may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning
ordinance itself; and (3) that the use to be authorized by the variance
will not alter the essential character of the locality.
Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 76, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (1939).
10. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (rev.
ed. 1926). The standard of "unnecessary hardship" is taken from the Act.
Neither the fact that a property owner may suffer a financial disadvantage or
loss of certain benefits from the denial of a variance, nor the granting of a
variance to a landowner similarly situated in the neighborhood are, in and of
themselves, "unnecessary hardships." See 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7, § 43.02;
Note, SYRACUSE L. REV., supra note 7, at 87-88.
The majority of jurisdictions have concluded that a countervailing consid-
eration, one that would typically justify a denial of a variance, occurs when
the hardship is self-created. Nevertheless, it would appear that some inquiry
would be made as to the nature of the landowner's actions. Note, SYRAcusE
L. REV., supra note 7, at 87-88. For a more thorough discussion of standards
and relevant considerations for granting variances in Nebraska, see § l-B of
text infra.
11. Note, HARv. L. REv., supra note 7, at 1396. Utilization of the variance as a
device for fostering the practical use of land has been the subject of consider-
able debate. Disadvantages of this form of relief allegedly include: (1) the
fact that the standards typically employed are overly general and vague; (2)
the nature of the relief appears to foster corruption; (3) judicial review is
often hampered by the absence of discernible standards; (4) because the
grant of a variance does not alter the ordinance, prospective purchasers are
misled and their confidence is shaken, the public loses faith in the efficacy of
the ordinance, and future development of the property is rendered uncertain;
and (5) instances often arise when amendments to the ordinance may be
more beneficial than the granting of piecemeal relief by way of individual var-
iances. Id. at 1406. See 6 P. ROHAN, supra note 7, § 43.01[4]; Dallstream &
Hunt, supra note 7, at 235-36; Gaylord, supra note 7, at 196-97; Shapiro, supra
note 7. See also NAT'L INST. OF LAw ENFORCEMENT & CRmMNAL JUSTICE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN ANAL-
YSIS OF ZONING REFORMS: MINIMIZING THE INCENTIVE FOR CORRUPION (1979)
(variances "are often not understood by citizens, sometimes not by the
1981]
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a true variance, unlike an exception or a special permit, 12 is
designed to preserve the constitutionality of zoning legislation due
to the avoidance of a confiscatory effect which would often result
from slavish application of the ordinance to the private property
involved.' 3 There is, however, no legal right to a variance, and
vested rights are not affected by either the denial or the grant of a
variance. 14 Whether a variance will be granted ultimately will be
boards and councils granting them, and in a few cases not by the courts." Id.
at 4).
12. [A] n exception is a permission given by the board, properly author-
ized by ordinance in specific cases, for an applicant to use his prop-
erty in a manner contrary to the provisions of an ordinance, provided
such use subserves the general welfare and protects community in-
terests. A variance, on the other hand, is an authorization by a
board, usually on appeal, granting relief and doing substantial justice
in the use of his property by a property owner, where, owing to spe-
cial conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordi-
nance will result in unnecessary hardship.
2 E. YOKLEY, supra note 7, § 15-4.
13. The purpose of a provision authorizing the granting of relief in a
specific case of hardship is to permit the amelioration of the rigors of
necessarily general regulations by eliminating the necessity of a
slavish adherence to the precise letter of the limitations where in a
given case little or no good on the one side and undue hardship on
the other would result from a literal enforcement and to protect the
ordinance against attack on the ground of unreasonable interference
with private rights.
Peterson v. Vasak, 162 Neb. 498, 508, 76 N.W.2d 420, 426-27 (1956) (citing Lee v.
Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 37 S.E.2d 128 (1946); Annot., 168 A.LR. 13
(1947)).
From the practical standpoint of a landowner or prospective purchaser, a
variance may be considered more desirable than a request for a parcel rezon-
ing or a constitutional challenge. The variance generally affords more imme-
diate and less complicated relief. See § I1-A of text infra. It is considerably
less expensive, and more likely to be attained than is a judicial determination
that the relevant zoning ordinance is invalid or unconstitutional. Moreover,
society may benefit from the development of the variance form of relief.
Among the justifications commonly asserted by its proponents are: (1) eco-
nomic utilization of stagnating property; (2) constitutional considerations, in-
cluding both the confiscation issue and the question of discriminatory
application; and (3) prevention of illegal spot zoning, which is wholly prefera-
ble to new legislation which might weaken the uniformity and effectiveness
of the zoning ordinance. 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7, § 43.01[4]; Green, supra
note 7; Reps, supra note 7.
14. 2 E. YOKLEY, supra note 7, § 15-5. However, it is interesting to note that an-
other feature that distinguishes a variance from an exception is that some
courts hold that the variance creates a vested right that runs with the land,
while an exception is personal to the owner and terminates upon dispostion
of the property. 6 P. RoAN, supra note 7, § 43.01[2] [a]. Compare Balodis v.
Fallwood Park Homes, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 936, 283 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1967) (special
exception terminates on sale) with County of Imperial v. McDougal, 19 Cal.
3d 505, 564 P.2d 14, 138 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1977) (special exception runs with the
land).
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determined on the basis of an analysis of the circumstances of
each case.15 In addition, zoning boards of appeal commonly have
authority to attach reasonable conditions to the granting of a vari-
ance. 16 Imposition of such conditions is thought necessary in
many cases in order to protect the intent of a community's compre-
hensive plan and achieve substantial justice while serving the in-
terests of the individual landowners aggrieved by the ordinance. 17
Zoning ordinances typically authorize two types of variances:
use variances and area variances. 18 A use variance authorizes a
use not normally permissible in the district of the situs, e.g., a
nursery in a residential district. Area variances, on the other hand,
permit landowners to depart from dimension requirements, e.g.,
height and setback restrictions. The standards of proof applied by
courts on review will often differ depending on the type of variance
requested. Consequently, characterization of the type of variance
involved is an important consideration. 19
15. Alumni Control Bd., Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 179 Neb. 194, 137 N.W.2d 800
(1965); 2 E. YOKLEY, supra note 7, § 15-5.
16. Enabling legislation commonly allows for conditions to be imposed on the
grant of special permits or exceptions. However, power to impose conditions
in cases of variances must be inferred from statutory language or from the
express provisions of a municipality's zoning ordinance. Such conditions
must be reasonably calculated to achieve a legitimate objective of the zoning
ordinance, and must be related to the purposes of zoning. Unnecessary, arbi-
tary, or unreasonable conditions, as well as those which are found to be
vague or indefinite, will be invalidated. Finally, any conditions must attach to
the land rather than to the owner personally. 6 P. RoHaN, supra note 7, §
43.03 [2]. For a discussion of "conditional zoning", see § H-C of text infra.
17. Comment, Zoning Amendments and Variances Subject to Conditions, 12 SYR-
ACUSE L. REV. 230 (1960).
18. While Nebraska statutes do not expressly categorize types of variances, the
distinction is implicit. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-411 (Reissue 1977) (cities of
metropolitan class); id. § 15-1106 (Reissue 1977) (cities of primary class); id.
§ 19-910 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (villages, cities of the first and second class); id. §
23-174.09 (Reissue 1977) (counties); note 76 infra.
19. In the language of the Nebraska Supreme Court:
Use variances are customarily concerned with "hardship" while
area variances are customarily concerned with "practical difficulty."
A use variance is one which permits a use other than that prescribed
by the zoning ordinance in a particular district. An area variance has
no relationship to a change of use. It is primarily a grant to erect,
alter, or use a structure for a permitted use in a manner other than
that prescribed by the restrictions of the zoning ordinance.
Alumni Control Bd., Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 179 Neb. 194, 195-96, 137 N.W.2d
800, 802 (1965) (emphasis added). See 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7, § 43.01[2].
The jurisdictions are divided on their approach to the application of stan-
dards of review regarding area and use variance requests. While some refuse
to recognize any distinctions of review between the type of variance re-
quested, a higher degree of proof is often required for use variances. This
distinction is typically justified due to the peculiarly greater impact use vari-
ances are thought to have on the community. 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7,
1981]
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State enabling legislation and local zoning ordinances provide
general requirements for obtaining a variance.20 However, it is
generally agreed that the applicant must meet certain broad condi-
tions. First, the applicant must have "a legal interest in the prop-
erty, or at a minimum have an option to purchase or a binding
contract to acquire such an interest."'21 Moreover, the applicant's
hardship must be related to his possession of the land or a legal
interest in it.22 Courts typically require that the difficulties en-
§ 43.01[ 2]. A minority of jurisdictions impose a strict "unnecessary hardship"
standard to all requests for use variances, while imposing a "practical difficul-
ties" test to requests for area variances. Id. As evidenced by the Alumni
Control Bd. decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court seems to have adopted
this position.
In Alumni Control Bd., the Nebraska Supreme Court expounded upon the
standards applicable to a situation in which a request was made for what
was, in part, an area variance. After a discussion in which the court distin-
guished use and area variances and their respective standards, the court
stated:
The criteria generally and properly before a board of appeals on an
application for a variance from area restrictions of a zoning code are:
(1) Whether compliance with the strict letter of the restrictions gov-
erning area, set backs, frontage, height, bulk, or density would unrea-
sonably prevent the owner from using the property for a permitted
purpose or would render conformity with such restrictions unneces-
sarily burdensome; (2) whether a grant of the variance applied for
would do substantial justice to the applicant as well as to other prop-
erty owners in the district, or whether a lesser relaxation than that
applied for would give substantial relief to the owner of the property
involved and be more consistent with justice to other property own-
ers; and (3) whether relief can be granted in such a fashion that the
spirit of the ordinance will be observed and public safety and welfare
secured.
179 Neb. at 196-97, 137 N.W.2d at 802 (citing 2 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAw OF ZON-
ING AND PLANNING § 45-28 (3d ed. 1956)). See notes 60-76 & accompanying text
infra.
20. See § IH-A of text infra.
21. 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7, § 43.02[1]. At least one commentator would not
limit the extent of standing granted an option holder. The argument is that
even the holder of an option to purchase land should qualify notwithstanding
the fact that he is not bound to exercise the option. Since the purchaser may
be allowed to use a variance granted his seller, allowing him to obtain the
variance directly would further the reasonable use of the property. "An op-
tion holder or even a prospective purchaser without an option would be en-
couraged to buy and use the property if prior to purchase he were permitted
to ask for and receive a variance." Note, HAv. L. REv., supra note 7, at 1398.
For a full discussion of the standing issue, see notes 41-45 & accompanying
text infra.
22. Cf. Garibaldi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 163 Conn. 235, 239-40, 303 A.2d 743, 745
(1972) ("Personal hardships, regardless of how compelling or how far beyond
the control of the individual applicant, do not provide sufficient grounds for
the granting of a variance."); Alumni Control Bd., Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 179
Neb. 194, 198, 137 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1965) ('"e mere fact that the plaintff
would like to have a fraternity house of larger dimensions does not establish
[Vol. 60:81
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countered must not be self-created.23 The petitioning landowner
or interest holder must show that his situation is unique and dis-
tinct from adjoining landowners. 24 Finally, in conjunction with the
public interest requirement, the proposed use must not operate to
change the essential character of the neighborhood.25
A. Procedure for Granting Variances
Pursuant to Nebraska enabling legislation, cities, towns, vil-
lages, or counties that enact zoning legislation are authorized to
create entities called "boards of adjustment."26 Metropolitan cit-
ies 27 and cities of the primary class 2 8 are empowered to create
"boards of appeal".29 In villages, the local legislative body is
practical difficulty in complying with the ordinance."). See 6 P. RoHAN, supra
note 7, § 43.02[1]; 2 E. YOKLEY, supra note 7, § 15-12.
23. E.g., Abel v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 172 Conn. 286, 374 A.2d 227 (1977); Board
of Zoning Appeals v. Waskelo, 240 Ind. 594, 168 N.E.2d 72 (1960); Bienz v. City
of Dayton, 29 Or. App. 761, 566 P.2d 904 (1977). Several jurisdictions have
adopted liberal approaches in cases of prior knowledge of hardship condi-
tions before acquisition of the property, and in cases of self-created hard-
ships involving requests for area variances. 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7,
§ 43.02[2] [f].
24. E.g., City of Little Rock v. Kaufman, 249 Ark. 530, 460 S.W.2d 88 (1970); Peter-
son v. Vasak, 162 Neb. 498, 76 N.W.2d 420 (1956); Hankin v. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 384 A.2d 1386 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978). See 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7,
§ 43.02[21 [c], wherein the author cites a number of circumstances which may
satisfy the uniqueness test:
(1) where the property borders on a less restricted district, espe-
cially where the adjoining use is incompatible to that maintained by
the applicant; (2) where the land is located in a transition neighbor-
hood, and the cumulative effect of the deteriorating area and confis-
catory nature of the zoning restrictions is to exacerbate the
landowner's hardship; (3) where the property is unable to produce
any income because its buildings or structures are obsolete or in a
dilapidated condition; and (4) where the property is located near sig-
nificantly conflicting uses.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also 2 E. YomL Y,'Supra note 7, § 15-9; note 54 &
accompanying text infra.
25. E.g., Alumni Control Bd., Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 179 Neb. 194, 137 N.W.2d 800
(1965) (relief granted only when spirit of the ordinance will be observed).
This is simply a recognition of the importance given the underlying purposes
of zoning. See generally, 2 E. YomLY, supra note 7, § 15-10; Kratovil, Zoning:
A New Look, 11 CREIGHTON L. REv. 433 (1977).
26. NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-907 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (villages, cities of the first and
second class); id. § 23-168.01 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (counties).
27. A city of the metropolitan class has 300,000 inhabitants or more. Id. § 14-101
(Reissue 1977).
28. A city of the primary class has from 100,001 to 299,999 inhabitants. Id. § 15-101
(Reissue 1977).
29. Id. § 14-408 (Reissue 1977) (cities of metropolitan class); id. § 15-1106 (Reis-
sue 1977) (cities of the primary class).
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granted power to serve in this capacity. 30 Unlike boards of primary
class cities, those in cities of the first,31 second,32 and metropolitan
class, and those in villages have rules and procedures prescribed
by statute.33
Municipal boards have authority to hear appeals from adminis-
trative decisions. 34 Special exceptions to the terms of relevant or-
dinances may be heard and decided by villages and cities of the
first and second class, 35 while cities of the primary or metropolitan
class may decide all matters provided in the statute.3 6 Special per-
mits may be granted by a metropolitan board of appeals to the
state, a political subdivision, or a public utility for public service
purposes subject to the imposition of necessary and proper condi-
tions.3 7
Appeals to a board are generally taken from a refusal by a city
official to issue a building permit.38 As noted previously, in order
to have standing to request a variance, the applicant must have a
legally cognizable interest in the property in question.39 However,
some jurisdictions have granted standing to a lessee,4 ° an owner's
agent, an owner's assignee, or other interested party.4 1 In at least
two cases, the courts have indicated a desire to depart altogether
30. Id. § 19-911 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
31. A city of the first class has from 5,001 to 100,000 inhabitants. Id. § 16-101 (Reis-
sue 1977).
32. A city of the second class includes cities, towns, and villages of from 801 to
5,000 inhabitants. Id. § 17-101 (Reissue 1977).
33. See id. § 14-408 (Reissue 1977) (cities of metropolitan class); id. § 19-908 (Re-
issue of 1977) (villages, cities of the first and second class). A village includes
any town or village of not less than 100 nor more than 800 inhabitants incorpo-
rated under Nebraska law as a city, town or village, or any second class city
which has a village form of government. Id. § -17-201 (Reissue 1977).
34. NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-409 (Reissue 1977) (cities of metropolitan class); id. § 15-
1106 (Reissue 1977) (cities of the primary class); id. § 19-910 (Cum. Supp.
1980) (villages, cities of the first and second class).
35. Id. § 19-910 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
36. Id. § 14-409 (Reissue 1977) (cities of metropolitan class); id. § 15-1106 (Reis-
sue 1977) (cities of the primary class).
37. Id. § 14-412 (Reissue 1977).
38. E.g., Alumni Control Bd., Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 179 Neb. 194, 137 N.W.2d 800
(1965) (case involved application for a building permit requiring a variance).
39. See note 21 supra.
40. E.g., Finn v. Municipal Council, 136 N.J.L. 34, 53 A.2d 790 (1947); Poster Adver-
tising Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 408 Pa. 248, 182 A.2d 521 (1962); Ral-
ston Purina Co. v. Zoning Bd., 64 R.I. 197, 12 A.2d 219 (1940).
41. E.g., Cohn v. County Bd. of Supervisors, 135 Cal. App. 2d 180, 286 P.2d 836
(1955) (assignee); Stout v. Jenkins, 268 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1954) (agent); Slater
v. Toohill, 276 A.D. 850, 93 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1949) (purchaser of property under an
agreement conditioned upon procurement of variance).
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from the "legal interest" requirement.42 This seems to be the bet-
ter rule since it would tend to further the reasonable use of prop-
erty.4 3
The procedure prescribed by the Municipal Code of Lincoln,
Nebraska, is typical of procedures used by zoning boards of ap-
peals.44 Under the provisions of Lincoln's recently amended com-
prehensive zoning ordinance, the decision of the superintendent
for codes administration (building official) must be made in writ-
ing.45 Following that decision, any appeal must be taken within
sixty days by filing a notice of appeal with the superintendent
specifying the grounds.4 6 Then, the superintendent transfers all
documents constituting the record to the board.47 Upon receipt of
the appeal, the board must set a reasonable time for a hearing
within thirty days.4 8 Notice must be posted in a conspicuous place
visible from the street on or near the property upon which the ac-
tion is pending for at least eight days prior to public hearing49 and
notice of the time, place, and subject matter of the public hearing
must be published by the city clerk in a daily newspaper of general
circulation in the city.5 0 Any other notice deemed appropriate by
the public body, although neither mandatory nor a condition pre-
cedent to any hearing, may also be required.5 1
B. Standards
L Villages, Cities of the First and Second Class
Nebraska law provides that villages and cities of the first and
second class may grant a variance for "peculiar and exceptional
practical difficulties... or exceptional and undue hardships. ' '5 2 If
42. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Moyer, 108 Ind. App. 198, 27 N.E.2d 905 (1940);
Tramonti v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 93 R.L 131, 172 A.2d 93 (1961).
43. See Note, HARv. L. REV., supra note 7, at 1398; note 21 supra. Fora general
overview of the standing issue in variance cases, see Annot., 89 AL.R.2d 663
(1963).
44. LINcoLN, NEB., CODE § 27.75.030 (1979).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 27.81.050.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-910 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Under this provision, the board
of adjustment shall grant a variance under the following standard.
[w] here by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or shape
of a specific piece of property at the time of the enactment of the
zoning regulations, or by reason of exceptional situation or condition
of such piece of property, the strict application of any enacted regula-
tion under this act would result in peculiar and exceptional practical
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
relief may be granted without injury to the public welfare and
without substantially impairing the intent or purpose of any ordi-
nance, 53 a variance will be granted only if the board finds that:
(a) The strict application of the zoning regulation would produce undue
hardship;
(b) such hardship is not shared generally by other properties in the
same zoning district and the same vicinity;
(c) the authorization of such variance will not be of substantial detri-
ment to adjacent property and the character of the district will not be
changed by the granting of the variance; and
(d) the granting of such variance is based upon reason of demonstrable
and exceptional hardship as distinguished from variations for pur-
poses of convenience, profit or caprice.
5 4
As if the above criteria are not sufficiently restrictive to limit the
indiscriminate granting of variances, a further provision is made
that unless the board finds that the condition or intended use of
the property involved is not so general or recurring in nature that
an amendment to the ordinance would be justified, a variance ap-
plication will be denied.55
2. Cities of the Primary Class
A city of the primary class is given power to grant a variance for
"peculiar, exceptional, and unusual circumstances" not generally
found in the area concerned.5 6 The statute sets forth no list of fac-
difficulties to or exceptional and undue hardships upon the owner of
such property ....
Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id. Again, this is the codification of a primary tenet in zoning law: a variance
will not be granted if it is in derogation of the spirit, intent and general plan of
the applicable zoning ordinance. Alumni Control Bd., Inc. v. City of Lincoln,
179 Neb. 194, 198, 137 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1965).
54. NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-910 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
55. Id. This provision is in harmony with the general rule that an amendment of
an ordinance under the guise of a variance is prohibited. City of Lincoln v.
Foss, 119 Neb. 666, 230 N.W. 592 (1930). See 2 E. YOKLEY, supra note 7, § 15-13.
56. NEB. REv. STAT. § 15-1106 (Reissue 1977). The Lincoln Municipal Code closely
follows the wording of the statute:
The jurisdiction of the board of zoning appeals shall be limited to the
following:
(b) Powers relative to variances. To hear and decide upon peti-
tions for variances and, subject to such standards, principles, and
procedures provided in this title, to vary the strict application of the
height, area, parking, or density requirements to the extent neces-
sary to permit the owner a reasonable use of the land in those speci-
fied instances where there are peculiar, exceptional, and unusual
circumstances in connection with a specific parcel of land, which cir-
cumstances are not generally found within the locality or neighbor-
hood concerned.
LwIcoLN, NEB., CODE § 27.75.040 (1979) (emphasis added).
The importance of the "reasonable use" language which appears in the
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tors similar to those provided for villages, cities of the first and sec-
ond class, and counties. Whether or not a given landowner comes
within the "peculiar, exceptional, or unusual circumstances" lan-
guage would appear to be solely within the discretion of the board,
subject only to the "standards and procedures"5 7 provided in the
zoning ordinance as a whole.5 8 However, one decision by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court aids one in understanding how such a de-
termination is made, and how courts will approach the decision on
review.5 9
Alumni Control Board v. City of Lincoln60 involved an appeal
from a denial of an application for a building permit requiring a
variance in front, rear, and side yard requirements, and in off-
street parking requirements of the Lincoln zoning ordinance. The
owner's position was that it was not economically feasible to con-
struct a fraternity house for less than forty-eight men-the practi-
cal result of the restrictions imposed by the ordinance. 61 This fact,
together with the requirements of the University of Nebraska's
housing code, was asserted by the plaintiff as constituting "practi-
cal difficulties" sufficient to require the granting of a variance. 62
The court found that "practical difficulties" was an appropriate
standard for weighing the applicant's request for an area variance,
i.e., the question regarding the front, rear, and side yard require-
ments.6 3 Following a discussion of the criteria relevant to an appli-
cation of this type,64 the court held that the action of the board and
Lincoln Code and the statute was made apparent in the Alumni Control Bd.
case. A reasonable use of property may be very broadly defined. If the appli-
cant's use at the time of his request is "reasonable", there is no requirement
to grant the variance.
The restrictions of the ordinance do not prevent the property from
being used for any of the other authorized uses permitted in the dis-
trict. There is essentially no difference here from any case in which
an owner desires to expand, but finds himself with not enough prop-
erty to do so and also meet the conditions of the ordinance.
179 Neb. 194, 198, 137 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1965).
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 15-1106 (Reissue 1977).
58. Id.
59. Alumni Control Bd., Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 179 Neb. 194, 137 N.W.2d 800
(1965).
60. Id.
61. A 30 by 60 feet, four-story building was proposed. Under the provisions of the
zoning code, the maximum building size allowed on the property zoned F-
restricted commercial was 28 by 48.6 feet. However, a house built in compli-
ance with both the city zoning code and the University housing code would
only accommodate 36 men. Id. at 195, 137 N.W.2d at 801.
62. Id.
63. By drawing a distinction between the standards used when analyzing use
and area variances, the Nebraska Supreme Court has sided with the minority
position in the United States. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
64. See note 19 supra.
1981]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the city council in denying the requested variance was not unrea-
sonable, arbitrary, or illegal.65 The court found that: (1) unlike the
majority of cases in which courts have found "practical difficul-
ties", this case did not involve a substandard lot;66 (2) there was no
evidence that the reasons constituting the plaintiffs claim of prac-
tical difficulty were unique to the property;67 (3) the ordinance did
not prevent the property from being used for any other authorized
uses permitted in the district;68 (4) even if the issue of "practical
difficulty" was conceded, the area requirements were reasonable;69
(5) granting the variance would have been in derogation of the
spirit, intent, and plan of the ordinance; 70 (6) the application was
opposed by adjoining landowners and substantial justice would
not be done to them;7 1 and (7) the acts of the board were not an
abuse of discretion or unreasonable, arbitrary, or illegal.72
The off-street parking issue prompted an interesting approach
by the court. Since this aspect involved a variance of a hybrid na-
ture, technically involving both use and area restrictions, the court
apparently analyzed the circumstances under both the "unneces-
sary hardship" standard commonly invoked in instances involving
use variances, and the '"practical difficulties" standard applicable
to the question of area variances. 73 The court concluded that there
was "no evidence of practical difficulty, nor unnecessary hardship,
nor, in fact, of any other reason why the ordinance cannot be spe-
cifically complied with. '74
As a result of the Alumni Control Board decision, it would ap-
65. 179 Neb. at 200, 137 N.W.2d at 804. The scope of review in a case involving a
denial of a request for a variance is generally thought to be extremely lmited.
E.g., Speedway Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Standard Concrete Materials, Inc.,
150 Ind. App. 363, 276 N.E.2d 589 (1971). However, in Nebraska the scope of
review in decisions granting a variance would appear to be very similar to
that in decisions denying a variance. Cf. Weber v. City of Grand Island, 165
Neb. 827, 87 N.W.2d 575 (1958) (board's decision to grant variance will not be
disturbed unless it is found to be illegal, or from standpoint of fact is not
supported by evidence, or is arbitrary and unreasonable, or is clearly wrong).
66. 179 Neb. at 196, 137 N.W.2d at 802. Courts are more likely to grant relief in
cases of substandard lots because often no "reasonable use" could otherwise
be made of the parcel, and because the granting of a variance would usually
pose no threat to neighboring property. 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7, § 43.02[3]
(citing Wilcox v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 17 N.Y.2d 249, 217 N.E.2d 633, 270
N.Y.S.2d (1966)).
67. 179 Neb. at 197, 137 N.W.2d at 802. See note 24 & accompanying text supra.
68. 179 Neb. at 198, 137 N.W.2d at 803.
69. Id. See note 56 supra.
70. 179 Neb. at 198, 137 N.W.2d at 803. See note 53 & accompanying text supra.
71. 179 Neb. at 198, 137 N.W.2d at 803.
72. Id. at 200, 137 N.W.2d at 804. See note 65 supra.
73. See note 19 supra.
74. 179 Neb. at 199, 137 N.W.2d at 803.
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pear that, notwithstanding the absence of statutory language pre-
scribing the "practical difficulties" standard for cases involving
area variances within a city of the primary class, reviewing courts
will be free to adopt this standard and its accompanying criteria.
Furthermore, in all classes of cities, and in villages and counties in
which requests for area variances are concerned, the "practical
difficulties" test would apparently apply. This approach is argua-
bly more appropriate in those cases involving cities of the metro-
politan class, villages, and cities of the first and second class due to
the presence of "practical difficulties" language in the relevant
statutes.7 5 Nevertheless, the statutes collectively neither make the
use-area distinction, nor expressly require the application of dif-
ferent standards.7 6 Alumni Control Board also appears to stand
implicitly for the proposition that use variances are recognized as
valid in Nebraska.
3. Cities of the Metropolitan Class
A city of the metropolitan class may allow a variance in cases of
"practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships. '77 Like statutes in
other jurisdictions, this provision neither defines the phrase "un-
necessary hardship," nor attempts to qualify its breadth through
the addition of relevant factors to be considered.7 8 Its application
in each instance is left to the wise discretion of the proper authori-
ties, partly because the language does not readily lend itself to pre-
cise definition. Moreover, it could be argued that any attempt to do
so would risk resolving wholly distinct cases in similar fashion.7 9
75. NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-411 (Reissue 1977) (metropolitan class: "practical diffi-
culties or unnecessary hardships"); id. § 19-910 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (villages,
cities of first and second class: "peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties
or exceptional and undue hardships").
76. One could argue that the statutes do, in fact, make reference to variances
granted on the basis of both area and use restrictions. In NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 14-411 (Reissue 1977) (cities of the metropolitan class), the relevant lan-
guage is as follows: "the board of appeals shall have the power .... to vary
the application of any... ordinance relating to the use, construction or alter-
ation of buildings or structures or the use of land.... ." (emphasis added).
The Board of Zoning Appeals in Lincoln, Nebraska, has construed its en-
abling legislation as precluding the power to grant use variances. However,
granting area variances appears to be a fairly common practice. For example,
between January and September of 1980, only 9 of the 50 variance requests
filed with the Board were denied. Interview with V.C. Seth, Planning Depart-
ment of Lincoln, in Lincoln, Nebraska (Sept. 15, 1980).
77. NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-411 (Reissue 1977).
78. See id.
79. A report of the Committee on Planning and Zoning of Section of Local gov-
ernment Law and Committee on Public Regulation of Land Use of Section of
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the ABA cites a questionnaire sent
to committee members which asked them to express their views on whether
1981]
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Notwithstanding the legislature's apparent reluctance to define
or not the standards of "practical difficulties" or "unnecessary hardship"
were appropriate, too broad, or too restrictive. A slight majority believed that
the standards were too broad. Committee Report, supra note 8, at 34. The
following is a list of suggested criteria furnished by participants:
A. Practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship including where
strict enforcement will cause needless expense, difficulty or hardship
without serving any useful public purpose or where the grant of a
variance will be in the best interests of the neighborhood or commu-
nity.
B. (1) The property in question cannot yield a reasonable re-
turn if used under the conditions allowed by the regulations in that
zone;
(2) The plight of the landowner is due to unique circumstances
not created by the landowner and
(3) The variance, if granted will not alter the essential character
of the locality.
A variance shall be permitted only if the evidence, in the judg-
ment of the designated authority, sustains each of the three condi-
tions enumerated. The governing body may provide general or
specific rules implementing, but not inconsistent with, the rules
herein provided to govern determinations of the designated authority
.... A variance shall not be granted which will permit the estab-
lishment of a use not permitted in the particular district.
C. (3) The practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship is
caused by this ordinance and has not been created by intentional ac-
tion of any person presently having an interest in the property.
(7) The granting of the variance will not impair an adequate sup-
ply of light and air to adjacent property, or overcrowd the land, or
create an undue concentration of population, or substantially in-
crease the congestion of the streets, or create hazardous traffic condi-
tions, or increase the danger of fire, or othewise endanger the public
safety.
(8) The variance will not adversely affect transportation or un-
duly burden water, sewer, school, park or other public facilities.
(Baltimore, Md., Zoning Ordinance).
D. Variances from the terms of the zoning ordinance shall be
granted only when, because of special circumstances applicable to
the property including size, shape, topography, location or surround-
ings, the strict application of the zoning ordinance deprives such
property of privileges enjoyed by other property in the vicinity and
under identical zoning classification.
Any variance granted shall be subject to such conditions as will
assure that the adjustment thereby authorized shall not constitute a
grant of special privileges inconsistent with the limitations upon
other properties in the vicinity and zone in which such property is
situated.
A variance shall not be granted for a parcel of property which au-
thorizes a use or activity which is not otherwise expressly authorized
by the zone regulation governing the parcel of property. (Cal. Gov-
ernment Code § 69506).
E. (a) That there are special circumstances or conditions ap-
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the standard,80 the Nebraska Supreme Court has shed some light
on the subject through its decision in Peterson v. Vasak.81 Peter-
son involved the denial of an application to the Building Depart-
ment of the City of Omaha, Nebraska, for a certificate of occupancy
in order to improve upon an irregularly shaped triangular tract
containing 13,619 square feet in a residential zone.82 The applica-
ble ordinance required 20,000 square feet for a single family dwell-
ing and also contained setback and side yard requirements which,
plying to the land, building or use referred to in the application and
which do not apply to other properties in the district; and
(b) That such special circumstances were not created by the
owner or applicant; and
(c) That the authorizing of the variance is necessary for the
preservation and enjoyment of substantial property rights; and
(d) That the authorizing of the application will not be materially
detrimental to the persons residing or working in the vicinity, to adja-
cent property, to the neighborhood, or to the public welfare in gen-
eral. (Phoenix, Ariz., Zoning Ordinance).
Id. at 36-37.
80. While legislation provides criteria for determining whether or not to grant a
variance regarding villages, cities of the first and second class and counties, it
is not known whether or not these factors will apply for all standards in all
statutes enabling boards of appeal to grant variances. See note 54 & accompa-
nying text supra. A study undertaken in Nebraska suggested several factors
which should be considered prior to granting a variance:
a. That the applicant has shown the premises cannot reasonably be
used in conformity with the regulations;
b. That the difficulty or hardship alleged relates solely to the prem-
ises involved and not to other premises of the applicant;
c. That the difficulty or hardship arises from the application of the
regulations and not from some act of the applicant or someone
acting in his behalf;
d. That the difficulty or hardship relates only to the premises in-
volved and not to some factor which applies equally to all other
land in the same zone classifications;
e. That the difficulty or hardship is something more than mere
financial loss to the applicant;
f. That the particular variance is not expressly prohibited or ex-
cluded by the regulations;
g. That the permission requested refers to a use of or structure on
the land itself and not to some use or structure which the appli-
cant can have, but others may not have;
h. If the Board has had a previous hearing concerning the same use
of the same premises, then it does not hold a rehearing without
an allegation in the application and proof at the hearing that
there has been a change of conditions affecting that same prop-
erty since the prior decision or that other considerations materi-
ally affecting the merits of the subject matter have intervened
and no vested rights have arisen in the meantime.
Coupland, Rural Zoning in Nebraska, 54 NEB. L. REv. 586, 597 (1975) (footnote
omitted).
81. 162 Neb. 498, 76 N.W.2d 420 (1956).
82. Id. at 504, 76 N.W.2d at 425.
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under the circumstances, made compliance impossible.83 Conced-
ing that the limitations and requirements of the ordinance had the
practical economic effect of rendering the land unusable and gen-
erally valueless, the court reversed and remanded the decision,
and ordered the City Board to issue the certificate on the grounds
of "unnecessary hardship".84 The court stated the relevant consid-
erations under the standard:
The criterion of unnecessary hardship is that the use restriction, view-
ing the property in the setting of its environment, is so unreasonable as to
constitute an arbitrary and capricious interference with the basic right of
private property; or that there is convincing proof that it is impossible to
use the property for a conforming purpose; or that there are factors suffi-
cient to constitute such a hardship that would in effect deprive the owner
of his property without compensation. An unnecessary hardship exists
when all the relevant factors taken together convince that the plight of the
location concerned is unique in that it cannot be put to a conforming use
because of the limitations imposed upon the property by reason of its clas-
sification in a specific zone.
8 5
The court found that the circumstances showing a deprivation
of value and use of the landowner's property established an in-
stance of unnecessary hardship specifically contemplated as being
within the coverage of the statute.8 6 Consequently, Peterson
would appear to stand as a definitive judicial statement on the type
of circumstances required to come under the unnecessary hard-
ship standard in Nebraska.
4. Counties
County boards are required by law to appoint a board of adjust-
ment.87 Members of the board of adjustment cannot serve on the
county board of commissioners or county board of supervisors. 88
Subject to conditions and safeguards established by the county
board, the board of adjustment may grant a variance in cases of
"peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties ... or exceptional
and undue hardships." 89 In all relevant aspects the statutory re-
quirements are identical to those requirements prescribed for vil-
lages, and cities of the first and second class, and the statute also
lists mandatory findings as a condition of granting a variance. 90
83. Id. at 505, 76 N.W.2d at 426.
84. Id. at 510, 76 N.W.2d at 427.
85. Id. at 508, 76 N.W.2d at 426.
86. Id. at 510, 76 N.W.2d at 427.
87. NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-168.01 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 23-168.03 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
90. Id. See note 54 & accompanying text supra.
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C. Judicial Review
Generally, persons "aggrieved" by any decision of the zoning
board may seek de novo review in the district court.91 Aggrieved
parties have been held to include neighboring property owners
who are able to prove that denial of a variance application has
caused a depreciation in value of their property or, conversely, that
the granting of a variance has significantly impaired enjoyment of
their property.92 However, it has been asserted that any taxpayer,
officer, department, board, or bureau of the municipality should
have standing to petition for review.9 3
It has been held in Nebraska that once granted, a variance from
an applicable zoning ordinance is presumed to be legal and correct
until rescinded, amended or reversed by a court of competent ju-
risdiction.94 This presumption is attributable, in part, to the fact
that a determination as to what serves the public interest in rela-
tion to zoning ordinances affecting the use of property is primarily
within the peculiar discretion of the zoning board.95 As a result,
the board's decision will typically not be disturbed "unless it is
found to be illegal, or from standpoint of fact not supported by evi-
dence, or is arbitrary and unreasonable, or is clearly wrong."96
Thus, judicial review has a limited function in this area.9 7
91. Id. §§ 14-413 to -414 (Reissue 1977) (cities of the metropolitan class); id. §§ 15-
1201 to -1205 (Reissue 1977) (cities of the primary class); id. § 19-912 (Reissue
1977) (villages, cities of the first and second class); id. § 23-168.04 (Reissue
1977) (counties). Cf. Roncka v. Fogarty, 152 Neb. 467, 41 N.W.2d 745 (1950)
(under home rule charter, persons jointly or severally aggrieved by decision
of zoning board may petition district court for review).
92. Note, HAnv. L. REV., supra note 7, at 1400. Cf. Bagley v. Sarpy County, 189
Neb. 393, 202 N.W.2d 841 (1972) (plaintiffs had standing as landowners in
Douglas County in order to challenge a rezoning resolution passed by the
county board of Sarpy County on ground that the county had failed to adopt a
comprehensive development plan).
93. Note, Hanv. L. REV., supra note 7, at 1400 (citing Standard State Enabling Act
§ 7).
94. Adler v. Lynch, 415 F. Supp. 705 (D. Neb. 1976).
95. Graham v. Graybar Elec. Co., 158 Neb. 527, 63 N.W.2d 774 (1954); City of
Omaha v. Glissman, 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.W.2d 828, appeal dismissed, 339 U.S.
960 (1949).
96. Weber v. City of Grand Island, 165 Neb, 827, 829, 87 N.W.2d 575, 577-78 (1958).
97. 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7, § 43.01[3]; Comment, Judicial Control over Zoning
Boards of Appeal Suggestions for Reform, 12 U.C.L.A. L REV. 937 (1965);
note 65 supra. Cf City of Imperial v. Raile, 187 Neb. 404,191 N.W.2d 442 (1971)
(although applicant for variance which was denied claimed that others had
been granted variances under similar circumstances, evidence was sufficient
to support determination that application of the zoning ordinance to the land-
owner was not arbitrary or discriminatory).
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II. PARCEL REZONING OR AMENDMENT
Those who do not wish to seek relief from zoning restrictions
through application for a use variance or a special use permit may
seek rezoning of their lot to a less restrictive use by applying to the
local legislative body for an amendment to the zoning ordinance. 98
As a general rule, because rezoning is a legislative act 99 calling for
legislative judgment and the exercise of police power, any amend-
ment must pass constitutional scrutiny similar to that required of
an original zoning enactment.100 At the same time, the presump-
tion of validity which attaches to the original zoning legislation ap-
plies with equal force to an amendment.101
In short, an amendment is an ordinance. The local governing
body is authorized by the enabling act under which the original
ordinance was adopted to change the substantive or procedural re-
quirements of the existing law by amendment. 102 However, this
power may not be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or discrimi-
natory manner. 0 3
Substantive amendments may involve either the classification
of property in a different zone 104 or a change made in the uses per-
mitted in a particular zone.10 5 The former is the more common
98. For the amendment procedures provided by statute in Nebraska, see NEB.
REV. STAT. § 14-405 (Reissue 1977) (cities of the metropolitan class); id. § 15-
1105 (Reissue 1977) (cities of the primary class); id. § 19-905 (Reissue 1977)
(villages, cities of the first and second class); id. § 23-165 (Reissue 1977)
(counties).
99. Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial
Action, 33 OHio ST. L.J. 130 (1972). The majority rule appears to be that
amendment procedures reflect a legislative function. However, a minority of
jurisdictions follow a rule that rezoning is a quasi-judicial or administrative
function requiring notice and hearing. See Fasano v. County Comm'rs, 264
Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7, § 39.01; Freilich, Fasano v.
Board of County Commissioners of Washington County: Is Rezoning an Ad-
ministrative or Legislative Function?, 6 UPRB. L. at vii (1974).
100. See Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 199 Neb. 178, 256 N.W.2d 686 (1977); Bucholz
v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
101. See Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 868-69, 120 N.W.2d 270, 275 (1963)
("Where the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes is
fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to controL").
102. In Nebraska, for example, cities of the primary class are given this power
under NEB. REV. STAT. § 15-1105 (Reissue 1977). For an example of an ordi-
nance reflecting this power, see LINcoLN, NEB., CODE § 27.81.040 (1979). Cf.
Hansen v. City of Norfolk, 201 Neb. 352, 359, 267 N.W.2d 537, 539 (1978) ("a
zoning ordinance may be amended from time to time as new and changing
conditions warrant revision").
103. Davis v. City of Omaha, 153 Neb. 460, 45 N.W.2d 172 (1950).
104. See Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 199 Neb. 178, 256 N.W.2d 686 (1977) (change
in zoning classification from Class A-2 single family dwelling district to class
C multiple dwelling district); § HI-B-1 of text infra.
105. See notes 107-08 & accompanying text infra.
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type of amendment. 0 6 This would include, for example, the zon-
ing of a once commercially zoned parcel for residential uses-thus,
changing only the face of the zoning map. A change in use, on the
other hand, is the least popular type of amendment. 0 7 An amend-
ment of this sort involves a direct alteration of the text of the ordi-
nance. The addition of a service station use to the existing uses
allowed in a residential zone would be an example. 0 8
In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,'0 9 the Supreme Court estab-
lished the constitutional validity of municipal zoning." 0 Specifi-
cally, the Court held that a zoning ordinance will be upheld if it is
reasonable and within the scope of the police power."' In an at-
tempt to delineate the scope of the police power, the Court broadly
held that in order for an amendment to pass constitutional scru-
tiny it must be in the interest of the health, safety, convenience,
morals, and general welfare of the community as a whole." 2
Under this standard, it has been held that a city rezoning ordi-
nance designed to permit construction of apartment houses ac-
commodating 400 units per city block in an area previously zoned
to hold apartments with a 30 unit maximum was an unreasonable
and arbitrary exercise of the zoning power.113
The general rule is that "a zoning ordinance may be amended
from time to time as new and changing conditions warrant revi-
sion."114 Among the factors that have been considered by local
governing bodies in determining the extent of changed conditions
are:11 5 (1) whether the area to be rezoned exhibits a real need for
a new use;" 6 (2) whether the existing zone classification has re-
106. 6 P. ROHAN, supra note 7, § 39.02.
107. Id.
108. The possible application of this kind of amendment is often over-
looked. Suppose, for example, a laundromat is permitted in commer-
cial zones but not in local business zones. The property on which an
owner intends to operate a laundromat is zoned local business. It
may be easier to have the ordinance amended to allow laundromats
in local business zones than it would be to have the property zoned
commercial.
Id.
109. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
110. Note, Zoning Growth Controls for the General Welfare, 55 NEB. . REV. 523,
527 (1976).
111. 272 U.S. at 395.
112. Id.
113. Davis v. City of Omaha, 153 Neb. 460, 45 N.W.2d 172 (1950).
114. Hansen v. City of Norfolk,-201 Neb. 352, 359, 267 N.W.2d 537, 541 (1978). Ac-
cord, Wolf v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d 501 (1964).
115. N. STEUBEN, REAL ESTATE PLANNMG 253 (1974).
116. Due to the contemporary approach to urban development, residential tracts
are often rezoned to allow construction of shopping centers. One example of
this occurred in Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862,120 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
The plaintiffs in Bucholz argued that the rezoning was illegal because the
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sulted in the complete loss of value of the land;117 (3) whether the
site is near other rezoned property in the same use district or is
located near other less restrictive use zones;"i8 (4) whether the
area will be used by a public utility;119 (5) whether increased traffic
notably affects the area, or it is located on existing transportation
routes; 120 and (6) whether rezoning will have a favorable impact on
tax revenues and other economic goals of common interest.' 2 '
An adjunct to the rule that the local governing body may not
exercise its police power in an arbitrary, capricious, or discrimina-
land was originally of a residential character, that it had a peculiar suitability
for residential use, and that the most appropriate use was residential. Id. at
869, 120 N.W.2d at 275. However, the defendants asserted that need was a
determinative factor. A planning consultant for the defendants testified that
"the welfare of the community as a whole required that the land be used for a
purpose which would tend to concentrate a large number of people at that
location or provide a convenience to a wide area of the city." Id. at 868, 120
N.W.2d at 275. Although the court noted that the evidence on the need issue
proved only a difference of opinion, the court upheld the rezoning ordinance
on the basis of the presumption of validity afforded the legislative classifica-
tion. Id. See notes 94-97 & accompanying text supra.
117. The City Council of Lincoln, Nebraska, recently reversed its previous deci-
sion to down-zone a lot, from B-1 local business to R-3 residential, based upon
evidence submitted by a property owner that the value of her property would
"decrease from $88,000 to about $8,000 if the zoning was changed." Lincoln
Journal, Feb. 5, 1980, at 11, col. 4. But cf. Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb.
862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963) (mere loss of value of homes recently constructed
on land adjacent to rezoned property does not render the rezoning illegal).
118. Cf. Hansen v. City of Norfolk, 201 Neb. 352, 267 N.W.2d 537 (1978) (concerning
an action rezoning property from M-2 heavy industrial to M-1 light industrial,
the court took note of the fact that due to a local flood control project in the
area, the nature of the area changed dramatically and "[ailmost all the busi-
nesses presently located within the area affected by the ordinance fit in the
category of light industrial." Id. at 359, 267 N.W.2d at 541).
119. N. STEUBEN, supra note 115, at 256.
120. Traffic congestion was a major contention of the plaintiffs in Bucholz. Argu-
ing that the proposed shopping center would not "lessen congestion in the
streets" as required by statute (currently NEB. REv. STAT. § 14-403 (Reissue
1977)), the plaintiffs noted the heavy traffic which would result from rezoning.
The court stated, however, that increased traffic "does not establish that the
zoning is illegal. The construction of a large regional shopping center in any
location would increase the traffic on the streets and highways leading to it.
The real question is whether the ... land is an appropriate location for such
a development." 174 Neb. at 867, 120 N.W.2d at 274. The court emphasized the
fact that the planning board did not consider the traffic load such that prop-
erty in the area could not be zoned commercial. Id. at 867-68, 120 N.W.2d at
274.
121. N. STEUBEN, supra note 115, at 257. Other specific changes of conditions
might include: (1) population increases; (2) new developments; (3) changes
in zoning concepts; (4) extensive highway improvements; and (5) blighted
areas. Arnebergh, Criteria for Rezoning: Valid Reasons, in 1964 IusTrruTE ON
PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINT DomAiN 45 (1965).
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tory manner,12 2 is the constitutional restriction placed upon "spot
zoning." Whenever a small parcel of land is given a different clas-
sification than that of the surrounding area, primarily for the bene-
fit of the owner and to the detriment of neighboring landowners, 123
the term "spot zoning" raises its ugly head. However, courts treat
the term as descriptive rather than legal.12 4 Spot zoning is not nec-
essarily invalid per se; its validity will be determined on a case-by-
case basis. Consequently, the fact that small individual tracts are
involved or that only one landowner is involved in a zoning change
request does not render rezoning invalid as spot zoning.12 5
A. The Amendment Process
Amendments are usually the response to a proposal made by
individual property owners, citizen groups, or local officials.
126
These proposals are, in turn, administered by the local governing
122. See note 96 & accompanying text supra.
123. Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 870, 120 N.W.2d 270, 275-76 (1963).
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Graham v. Graybar Elec. Co., 158 Neb. 527, 63 N.W.2d 774 (1954)).
However, spot zoning is a viable ground for invalidating a rezoning action.
Weber v. City of Grand Island, 165 Neb. 827, 87 N.W.2d 575 (1958).
'Spot zoning is invalid where some or all of the following factors are
present:
'1. a small parcel of land is singled out for special and privileged
treatment;
'2. the singling out is not in the public interest but only for the
benefit of the landowner;
'3. the action is not in accord with a comprehensive plan.
'The list is not meant to suggest that the three tests are mutually
exclusive. If spot zoning is invalid, usually all three elements are
present, or, said another way, the three statements may merely be
nuances of one another.'
Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 199 Neb. 178, 185, 256 N.W.2d 686, 690-91 (1977)
(quoting D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw § 93, at
169 (1975)).
126. See, e.g., LINcoL, NEB., CODE § 27.81.040 (1979) (city council may amend on
its own motion or on petition). In practice, amendments before the council
typically originate from the planning commission, the planning director, or
individual property owners and developers. See Hansen v. City of Norfolk,
201 Neb. 352, 267 N.W.2d 537 (1978) (as long as statutory procedures are fol-
lowed, the planning commission has power to recommend rezoning even
though application required signature of property owner or its agent).
In many jurisdictions, amendments result from referendum and initiative
procedures. See 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7, § 39.07. Whether or not such pro-
cedures may be used is apparently unsettled in Nebraska. Compare Kelley
v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956) (a city ordinance changing the zon-
ing classification of certain property from residential to business was an ad-
ministrative act not subject to referendum) with Scottsbluff Improvement
Ass'n v. City of Scottsbluff, 183 Neb. 722, 164 N.W.2d 215 (1969) (rezoning held
to be a legislative matter not subject to judicial review by a proceeding in
error).
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authority on a case-by-case basis-subject only to the guidelines
prescribed by Euclid.127 Thus, an amendment is arguably identi-
cal to a variance or a special exception except that it is issued by
the local governing authority instead of the board of appeals or ad-
justment. 128 However, one might assert that because the amend-
ment procedure often pivots on the piecemeal determination of
peculiar facts and circumstances of each proposed development, it
tends to promote the kind of discriminatory effect thought to be
alleviated by these remedies. 129
In villages of cities of the first and second class, any regulations,
restrictions, and boundaries authorized to be created by statute
may be amended. 130 By statute, an amendment will not become
effective except by the favorable vote of three-fourths of all the
members of the legislative body of a municipality whenever a pro-
test against such change is signed by the owners of
twenty per cent or more either of the area of the lots included in such
proposed change, or of those immediately adjacent on the sides and in the
rear thereof extending three hundred feet therefrom, and of those directly
opposite thereto extending three hundred feet from the street frontage
of such opposite lots .... 131
Public hearings and official notice requirements imposed by stat-
ute are equally applicable to amendments;132 however, additional
notice is specifically required by law.133
127. See notes 109-12 & accompanying text supra.
128. Booth, A Realistic Examination of Rezoning Procedure: The Complimentary
Requirements of Due Process and Judicial Review, 10 GA. L. REv. 753 (1976).
129. Id. at 764. See Peterson, Flexibility in Rezonings and Related Governmental
Land Use Decisions, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 499 (1975).
130. NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-905 (Reissue 1977).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. The provisions of section 19-904 relative to public hearings and offi-
cial notice shall apply equally to all changes or amendments. In ad-
dition to the publication of the notice therein prescribed, a notice
shall be posted in a conspicuous place on or near the property on
which action is pending. Such notice shall not be less than eighteen
inches in height and twenty-four inches in width with a white or yel-
low background and black letters not less than one and one half
inches in height. Such posted notice shall be so placed upon such
premises that it is easily visible from the street nearest the same and
shall be so posted at least ten days prior to the date of such hearing.
It shall be unlawful for anyone to remove, mutilate, destroy, or
change such posted notice prior to such hearing. Any person so do-
ing shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. If the record title own-
ers of any lots included in such proposed change be nonresidents of
the municipality, then a written notice of such hearing shall be
mailed by certified mail to them addressed to their last-known ad-
dresses at least ten days prior to such hearing. At the option of the
legislative body of the municipality, in place of the posted notice pro-
vided above, the owners or occupants of the real estate to be zoned or
rezoned and all real estate located within three hundred feet of the
[Vol. 60:81
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The procedures required by statute for cities of the metropoli-
tan class are similar to those prescribed above. However, some dif-
ferences are notable. For instance, protesting landowners'
property adjacent to the rear or opposite of the lots included in the
proposed change need only extend 100 feet therefrom or from the
street frontage of opposite lots respectively. 34 The vote on the
proposed amendment requires five-sevenths of all the members of
the city council. 135 Finally, the notice requirements are much less
detailed than those required for villages and cities of the first and
second class. 13 6 There needs to be only "one day's notice of the
time, place and purpose of [the public hearing on the proposed
amendments] . . . published in the official paper or a paper of gen-
eral circulation in such municipality, and not less than ten days
before such hearing."137
In cities of the primary class, any proposed amendment must
first be submitted to the planning commission for its recommenda-
tions and report.138 The commission must hold at least one public
real estate to be zoned or rezoned may be personally served with a
written notice thereof at least ten days prior to the date of the hear-
ing, if they can be served with such notice within the county where
such real estate is located. Where such notice cannot be served per-
sonally upon such owners or occupants in the county where such
real estate is located, a written notice of such hearing shall be mailed
to such owners or occupants addressed to their last-known addresses
at least ten days prior to such hearing. The provisions of this section
in reference to notice shall not apply (1) in the event of a proposed
change in such regulations, restrictions, or boundaries throughout
the entire area of an existing zoning district or of such municipality,
or (2) in the event additional or different types of zoning districts are
proposed, whether or not such additional or different districts are
made applicable to areas, or parts of areas, already within a zoning
district of the municipality, but only the requirements of section 19-
904 shall be applicable.
Id.
134. Id. § 14-405 (Reissue 1977).
135. Id.
136. See note 133 supra. The amendment process applicable to counties more
closely resembles that called for by cities of the metropolitan class.
Such regulations, restrictions and boundaries may from time to time
be amended, supplemented, changed, modified or repealed. In case,
however, of a protest against such change, signed by the owners of
twenty per cent or more either of the area of the lots included in such
proposed change, or of those immediately adjacent in the rear
thereof extending one hundred feet therefrom, or of those directly
opposite thereof extending one hundred feet from the street frontage
of such opposite lots, such amendments shall not become effective
except by the favorable vote of a two-thirds majority of the county
board. The provisions of section 23-164 relative to public hearings
and official notice shall apply equally to all changes or amendments.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-165 (Reissue 1977) (counties).
137. NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-404 (Reissue 1977).
138. Id.
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hearing before submitting its recommendations and report.139
Upon receipt of this information, the city council is required to
hold a further hearing before action on the amendment.14° Re-
quired notice includes publication in a newspaper of general circu-
lation at least once, and the notice must appear at least five days
prior to the date of the hearing.14 1 Furthermore, posted notice is
required to be maintained in a conspicuous place on or near the
property so that it is easily visible from the street.1' Such posting
must also occur at least five days prior to the hearing on the
amendment. 4 3
139. Id. The report of the commission must include information on the effect of
the proposed amendment on the comprehensive plan of the city:
Amendments. The city council may from time to time on its own
motion, or on petition, amend, supplement, or otherwise modify this
title. Any such proposed amendment, supplement, or modification
shall first be submitted to the planning commission for its recom-
mendations and report. Said report shall contain the findings of the
commission regarding the effect of the proposed amendment, supple-
ment, or modification upon adjacent property and upon the Compre-
hensive Plan of the City of Lincoln. After the recommendations and
report of the planning commission have been filed, the city council
shall, before enacting any proposed amendment, supplement, or
modification hold a public hearing in relation thereto, giving notice of
the time and place of such hearing as provided in section 27.81.050
hereafter.
In the event that the proposed amendment or change is denied by
the city council, no new request shall be made for the same or sub-
stantially similar amendment or change within one year of said de-
nial thereof.
LINcoLN, NEB., CODE § 27.81.040 (1979). For a discussion of compliance of
amendments with the comprehensive plan, see § IH-B of text infra.
140. NEB. REv. STAT. § 15-1105 (Reissue 1977).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. Notice requirements may vary. See LiNcoLN, NEB., CODE § 27.81.050
(1979).
Public hearings required under chapters 27.63, 27.75, and 27.81 of
this title shall not be held until notice thereof has been given in com-
pliance with the following provisions:
(a) A notice shall be posted in a conspicuous place on or near
the property upon which action is pending. The notice shall be
posted upon or as near to the subject premises as possible so that it
is easily visible from the street, and such notice shall be so posted for
at least eight (8) consecutive days before the date of such hearing. It
shall be unlawful for any person to remove, mutilate, destroy, or
change the posted notice prior to the hearing
(b) For public hearings required under chapter 27.81 only, at
least eight (8) days before the date of hearing, the city clerk shall
have published in a daily newspaper having a general circulation in
the City of Lincoln a notice of the time, place, and subject matter of
the public hearing;
(c) No public hearings shall be held by the planning commission
or the board of zoning appeals as required in this title until the provi-
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B. The Comprehensive Plan
Nebraska law requires the adoption of a comprehensive plan as
a condition precedent to the exercise of the zoning power by a mu-
nicipality. 144 Comprehensive plans generally include a land use
section and cover "all aspects of city and regional planning, em-
bracing, among other things, forecasts as to future population and
economic conditions, transportation needs, and proposals for utili-
ties.' 145 Consequently, zoning amendments must comply with the
existing comprehensive plan. 4 6
Judicial review of an amendment and its effect upon the com-
prehensive plan involves application of a test of reasonableness. 147
Moreover, the local council's legislative judgment is given great
deference because the legal presumption favoring the validity of
ordinances attaches with like vigor to rezoning legislation. 14 8
sions of this section have been complied with and notice has been
posted pursuant thereto;
(d) It shall not be necessary to give further notice of adjourned
or continued public hearing;
(e) Other notice, as may be deemed appropriate by the public
body conducting the hearing, may be given in advance of public hear-
ings. Such notice is not mandatory or required as a condition prece-
dent to any such public hearing.
Id.
144. Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 199 Neb. 178, 181, 256 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1977).
145. Id. at 180, 256 N.W.2d at 688.
The general plan for the improvement and development of the city of
the primary class shall be known as the comprehensive plan ....
The comprehensive plan shall, among other things, show:
(1) The general location, character, and extent of existing and pro-
posed streets and highways and railroad, air, and other transporta-
tion routes and terminals;
(2) Existing and proposed public ways, parks, grounds, and open
spaces;
(3) The general location, character, and extent of schools, school
grounds, and other educational facilities and properties;
(4) The general location and extent of existing and proposed public
utility installations;
(5) The general location and extent of community development and
housing activities; and
(6) The general location of existing and proposed public buildings,
structures, and facilities.
NEB. Rav. STAT. § 15-1102 (Reissue 1977) (emphasis added).
146. NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-901 (Reissue 1977) (villages, cities of the first and second
class); id. § 14-403 (Reissue 1977) (cities of the metropolitan class); id. § 15-
902 (Reissue 1977) (cities of the primary class).
147. 6 P. RoHAN, supra note 7, § 39.04.
148. Hansen v. City of Norfolk, 201 Neb. 352, 267 N.W.2d 537 (1978).
Municipal corporations are prima facie the judges of the necessity
and reasonableness of ordinances, and a legal presumption obtains
in their favor unless the contrary appears on the face of the ordi-
nance or is established by clear and unequivocal evidence ....
[T]he burden is upon the party attacking it as invalid to show by
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In Holmgren v. City of Lincoln,149 the Nebraska Supreme Court
sustained the validity of a zoning ordinance amendment that
changed the classification of a 4.6-acre tract from Class A-2, single-
family dwelling district, to Class C multiple-dwelling district. Ad-
jacent property owners initiated the suit, claiming that the ordi-
nance was invalid because the amendment was not "in accordance
with a comprehensive plan" as required by statute,150 and because
the ordinance was arbitrary and unreasonable since it resulted in
"spot zoning."151 The plaintiffs, who were also within the A-2 clas-
sification, contended that the single-family designation fixed the
use of the property, and, as such, the "in accordance with" lan-
guage of the enabling statute was violated. 52
The court noted that although the zoning enabling statutes in
many jurisdictions include provisions requiring that zoning be
conducted in accordance with a comprehensive plan, the courts
have found that the term "was not defined by statute and the
courts reached a variety of conclusions as to what the term
meant."' 53 The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded from the lan-
guage of the statute154 that the comprehensive plan was intended
to be a general guide. 55 It favored the following definition: "'It is
only as a series of statements and precepts, representing commu-
nity choice and decision as to the space needs of various activities
and the interrelationships of land uses, that the master plan can
effectively fulfill its role as a guide to regulatory action.' "156
The court held that the proposal was in accordance with the
clear and unequivocal evidence that the regulation imposed is so ar-
bitrary, unreasonable, or confiscatory as to amount to depriving such
party of property without due process of law.
Id. at 359, 267 N.W.2d at 541 (citing Schaffer v. City of Omaha, 197 Neb. 328, 248
N.W.2d 764 (1977)). See Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 199 Neb. 178, 256 N.W.2d
686 (1977); Stahla v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 186 Neb. 219, 182 N.W.2d 209
(1970).
149. 199 Neb. 178, 256 N.W.2d 686 (1977).
150. Id. at 179, 256 N.W.2d at 688. The plaintiffs cited the enabling legislation for
cities of the primary class. NEB. REv. STAT. § 15-902 (Reissue 1977).
151. 199 Neb. at 179, 256 N.W.2d at 688. For a general discussion of spot zoning, see
notes 123-25 & accompanying text supra.
152. Id. at 181, 256 N.W.2d at 689.
153. Id. at 182-83, 256 N.W.2d at 689.
154. NEB. REV. STAT. § 15-1102 (Reissue 1977).
155. 199 Neb. at 183, 256 N.W.2d at 690. The court relied on the reference in section
15-1102 to "'general distribution and general location of business and indus-
try, residential areas, utilities, and recreational, educational, and other cate-
gories of public and private land uses,' as well as to 'the recommended
standards of population density based upon population estimates."' 199 Neb.
at 183, 256 N.W.2d at 690.
156. 199 Neb. at 183-84, 256 N.W.2d at 690 (quoting Haar, In Accordance With A
Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1154, 1174 (1955)).
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plan because the amendment continued the residential use of the
property as provided in the comprehensive plan, and merely au-
thorized a higher concentration of population than that permitted
by the plan. 57 "This [was] not a case [of] a use entirely different
from that contemplated by the plan .... "158 Under the facts of
Holmgren, multiple-dwelling and row-house uses would be al-
lowed in addition to the existing single-family and two-family uses
permitted in the higher classification. 59 The court also rejected
the claim that the change in classification of the parcel constituted
invalid spot zoning, and fully supported the city council's action. 160
The following factors were considered to be significant:
(1) The tract itself and the land to the east and west is largely vacant. (2)
The change from the original proposed uses is not radical, that is, it is from
one type of residential use to another type of residential use. (3) There is
conflicting expert testimony as to whether the zone change is in the public
interest. (4) There is competent, conflicting evidence to the effect that the
tract of which the area in question is a part, does not, because of natural
and man-made boundaries lend itself to extensive single-family develop-
ment. (5) The land in question and the larger vacant tracts of which it is a
part are in diverse ownership and this fact supports the conclusion that
the rezoning was not for the special benefit of one single landowner to the
detriment of the others.16 1
After Holmgren, attacks upon rezoning legislation on the basis
of nonconformity with the comprehensive plan or on the basis of
"spot zoning" may fail unless they come within the narrow range
of circumstances acknowledged by the court. This again reflects
the attitude taken by the judiciary in situations involving legisla-
tive activity by a municipality.
C. Contract and Conditional Zoning
In some instances, landowners find themselves unable to com-
ply with the requirements necessary to procure administrative or
legislative relief from the application of zoning ordinances which
tend to restrict the use of their land. This occurs when, for in-
stance, the owner is unable to show "unnecessary hardship" as re-
quired for variances, 162 or a change of conditions sufficient to
warrant rezoning legislation.163 As an adjunct to the rezoning pro-
cedure, some states have allowed local legislative bodies to exact
promises of specific conduct from landowners in cases where re-
zoning applications indicate the possibility of harm to the munici-
157. 199 Neb. at 184, 256 N.W.2d at 690.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 179, 256 N.W.2d at 688.
160. Id. at 186, 256 N.W.2d at 691.
161. Id. at 185, 256 N.W.2d at 691.
162. See § 11-B of text supra.
163. See notes 115-21 & accompanying text supra.
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pality and/or adjoining landowners. The terms commonly used to
describe this alternative procedure are contract zoning or condi-
tional zoning.164
While courts often use the terms interchangeably, 165 a distinc-
tion may be drawn between contract zoning and conditional zoning
as devices for gaining relief from restrictive zoning. In general, the
terms refer to the imposition of land use restrictions by private
agreement in conjunction with the passage of rezoning legisla-
tion. 16 6 In contract zoning, an owner makes an enforceable prom-
ise to the local governing body in return for rezoning legislation or
an enforceable promise for it.167 On the other hand, in conditional
zoning, a rezoning ordinance is passed upon the condition that the
landowner perform an act prior to, simultaneously with, or after
passage of the ordinance. 16 8
The purpose of these devices is to foster flexibility in the rather
rigid scheme of contemporary "Euclidean" zoning.169 For exam-
ple, in cases where a landowner's property borders districts with
differing use classifications or where the district in which the prop-
erty is located is undergoing a change of use, the application of
rigid zoning concepts may preclude the owner from putting the
property to its most efficient use. Contract or conditional zoning
allow the owner the best use of his property while ensuring the
public welfare. This is accomplished by incorporating specific re-
strictions on the proposed use through the agreement. Such re-
strictions might typically include, inter alia, noise abatement,
traffic control, building setback and fencing requirements. 70 Con-
sequently, the landowner receives the benefit of rezoning while
the hardship to neighboring property owners and the municipality
is ameliorated.
Contract zoning has been assailed as an invalid abrogation of
the municipality's police power.'17 It is urged that such contracts
164. See Shapiro, The Casefor Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMP. LQ. 267 (1968); Tra-
ger, Contract Zoning, 23 MD. L. REv. 121 (1963); Comment, Toward a Strategy
for Utilization of Contract and Conditional Zoning, 51 J. URn. L 94 (1973);
Note, Contract and Conditional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning Flexibility, 23
HAsTmGs L.J. 825 (1972).
165. Note, supra note 164, at 831 n.38.
166. Id. at 830-31.
167. Id. at 831. Some courts have broadly characterized contract zoning as invalid.
Id.
168. Id. Conditional zoning has not been criticized to the same extent as contract
zoning.
169. Comment, supra note 164, at 95.
170. Note, supra note 164, at 830.
171. Id. at 833. This is the adjunct to the rule that "[a] city has no right or power
to enter into contracts which curtail or prohibit an exercise of its legislative
or administrative authority." Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 873, 120
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constitute a violation of public policy since they tend to shake the
public's confidence in the integrity and exercise of the municipal-
ity's discretion in zoning matters. 17 2 Furthermore, the use of con-
tract and conditional zoning is said to destroy the uniformity
accomplished by the comprehensive plan, and tends to evidence a
form of spot zoning.173
Although the contract and conditional zoning devices have suf-
fered criticism, several states have specifically recognized their va-
lidity.174 In response to the abrogation of police power argument,
it has been asserted that an agreement between a landowner and a
municipality amounts to a unilateral contract whereby the munici-
pality acts to rezone in return for the landowner's promise. Under
this construction of the agreement, neither side is held to a binding
promise. 75 Furthermore, it is said that the integrity of the munici-
pal body should not be tainted because all such legislation is sub-
ject to the test of reasonableness, 7 6 and because specific
guidelines could be adopted for use in cases involving contract or
conditional zoning.177
As to the harm caused to the comprehensive plan, it must be
asserted that strict compliance to the plan in every case causes ar-
N.W.2d 270, 277 (1963) (citing Nebraska City v. Nebraska City Speed & Fair
Ass'n, 107 Neb. 576, 186 N.W. 374 (1922)).
172. Comment, The Use andAbuse of Contract Zoning, 12 U.C.L.A. I REv. 897, 903
(1965).
173. Note, supra note 164, at 835.
174. Id. at 833. Nebraska is said to be among the states which have upheld the use
of contract or conditional zoning. Id. at 833 n.50.
175. Shapiro, supra note 164, at 270.
176. Note, supra note 164, at 834. For a discussion of the test of reasonableness in
instances of rezoning, see notes 111-13 & accompanying text supra.
177. Specific guidelines might include the following considerations:
(1) The agreement should be made in such a manner that there is
no abrogation of the police power, either by a promise to rezone or a
promise to maintain a zone for a certain period of time. The munici-
pality should carefully avoid any promise on its part in return for the
promise of the landowner.
(2) The rezoning amendment, considered together with and sub-
ject to the landowner's promises, should be a reasonable exercise of
the zoning power. Contract and conditional zoning finds its useful-
ness where there are competing uses within a zoning area, each hav-
ing a valid claim. In some situations the rezoning alone may not be
reasonable. However, the rezoning subject to the imposed restric-
tions may be reasonable. The court should consider both the rezon-
ing and the landowner's promise in determining the validity of the
ordinance. If the rezoning is unreasonable, even with the restric-
tions, the ordinance should be declared invalid.
(3) The landowner's promise should be either already per-
formed or enforceable by the city so as to insure performance. This
means the court should consider the nature of the agreement be-
tween the landowner and the city. Since the restrictions are worth-
less if they are unenforceable, and since the validity of the ordinance
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bitrary determinations and undue hardships.178 Arguably, the
flexibility afforded by these remedies would alleviate arbitrariness
when scrutinized under specific guidelines. Finally, questions con-
cerning spot zoning could be determined on a case-by-case basis
under the considerations applicable to all such instances. 179
Methods which have been used to implement contract or condi-
tional zoning include: (1) a unilateral contract between the city
and landowners;180 (2) a bilateral contract between the planning
commission and the landowner; 181 (3) an ordinance conditioned
upon a physical act to the property; 82 (4) an ordinance condi-
tioned upon an act involving other property;183 and (5) an ordi-
may depend upon its modification by the restrictions, their enforce-
ability is a legitimate concern of the court.
(4) The promises exacted should have a reasonable relation to
the rezoning, i.e., the rezoning itself should give rise to the need for
the restrictions which are imposed. This relation may be established
either by the community's need for protection against potentially
deleterious effects of the rezoning, or by the community's need for
public service facilities occasioned by the new use. Thus the agree-
ment may legitimately restrict the landowner's use of his property,
or it may require that he dedicate land to the city for public use.
However, extraneous considertion, such as giving land for a park
elsewhere in the city, would impeach the legislation by implying that
influence other than the worth of the rezoning was a part of the deci-
sion-making process.
Note, supra note 164, at 846 (footnotes omitted). For a list of other broad
suggestions in this regard, see Comment, supra note 164, at 111.
178. One commentator has argued that "the very specific requirements generally
embodied in proposed concomitant conditions are difficult, at best, to sub-
sume under the broad purposes enunciated in the comprehensive plan, espe-
cially when the zoning ordinance, enacted ostensibly as the chief
embodiment and manifestation of the plan, speaks in traditional 'Euclidean'
terms." Comment, supra note 164, at 106. Nevertheless, variances in general,
and many acts of rezoning often conflict with the general guidelines imposed
by the comprehensive plan. This occurs primarily as a result of an attempt to
aleviate the harm caused by the slavish application of the zoning ordinance.
179. See notes 123-25 & accompanying text supra.
180. Note, supra note 164, at 837. Under this method, the city can enforce the
agreement by specific performance, and if the contract also provides for a
covenant running with the land, it is enforceable by the city against subse-
quent purchasers. Id.
181. Id. at 838. It has been asserted that a bilateral agreement between the plan-
ning commission and the landowner would not operate as an abrogation of
the police power since the agreement would only call for a favorable recom-
mendation on the part of the commission. Id. Compare Pressman v. City of
Baltimore, 222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379 (1960) with City of Greenbelt v. Bresler,
248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967).
182. Note, supra note 164, at 839. It has been suggested, however, that this ar-
rangement would result in innumerable new use classifications for individual
tracts. Shapiro, supra note 164, at 280.
183. Note, supra note 164, at 840. This contemplates a dedication of other land by
the owner as a condition precedent to passage of the rezoning ordinance.
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nance conditioned upon the execution of a restrictive covenant.184
The most desirable of the foregoing methods should be the one
which least limits the exercise of the municipality's police power.
While not necessarily exclusive, the unilateral contract would ap-
pear to be the most desirable in this regard.185
The Nebraska Supreme Court has apparently approved the use
of contract or conditional zoning. In Bucholz v. City of Omaha,186 a
landowner and a developer with an option to purchase filed an ap-
plication to rezone a part of a larger tract of land for use as a new
shopping center.187 Following a public hearing on the matter, the
Planning Board recommended that the application be denied. Af-
ter a second hearing, the City Council adopted a motion that stated
it did not concur in the recommendation of the planning board.
The motion also directed that "rezoning ordinances and protective
covenants be prepared."' 88 Ordinances were enacted which re-
zoned the parcel, and the council approved a protective covenant
agreement submitted to it by the landowner and the option
holder.18 9
The presence of the protective covenant agreement gave rise to
a challenge to the legality of the rezoning. Adjacent landowners,
as plaintiffs, contended that the action of the council was the result
of a bargain or agreement between the applicants and the city.190
Although the court "assume Id] that the protective covenant agree-
ment was an inducement to the adoption of the rezoning ordi-
nances,"' 9 1 it nevertheless concluded that the protective covenant
agreement did not invalidate the ordinances. 192
The rezoning ordinances were adopted without reference to the
protective covenant agreement. Moreover, the agreement ex-
pressly provided that it was not conditioned upon a rezoning of the
land.193 It provided that the covenants would run with the land
and would be for the use and benefit of the owner, the city, and the
adjoining landowners. 194 The prospective buyer, made a party to
the agreement, was bound to specific conditions. 195 Consequently,
184. Id. Note, however, that if the landowner is simply required to execute and
record a restrictive covenant prior to passage, it may be rendered unenforce-
able as a unilateral declaration of intent by the owner.
185. See note 180 supra.
186. 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963). See Note, supra note 164, at 833 n.50.
187. 174 Neb. at 864, 120 N.W.2d at 273.
188. Id. at 865, 120 N.W.2d at 273.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 873, 120 N.W.2d at 277.
191. Id. at 872, 120 N.W.2d at 276.
192. Id. at 875, 120 N.W.2d at 278.
193. Id. at 872, 120 N.W.2d at 276.
194. Id., 120 N.W.2d at 277.
195. Id. The developer agreed to provide a grade-separated access to the shop-
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the agreement also included a direction by the council that cove-
nants be submitted to the city to insure that the representations of
the buyers would be fulfilled. In the event of breach, or in the
event that the sale was not made and land not conveyed to the
buyer, the city could again rezone the parcel.196 On the basis of
the foregoing agreement, the court stated:
The evidence in this case does not show a bargain or agreement be-
tween the applicants and the city. There is evidence that the applicants
made certain representations to the city council and other officials in an
effort to secure the rezoning .... Rezoning applications are usually sup-
ported by similar representations concerning the proposed use of the land
in question and, in many cases, may be an inducement for the action
taken by the zoning authorities. No one contends that an applicant for
rezoning should not disclose the proposed use to be made of the land in-
volved. The contention is that the applicants should not be allowed to give
some assurance that the proposed plans will be carried out.
The applicants in this case have merely agreed to do things which they
have represented that they intend to do. The effect of the protective cove-
nant agreement is to give some further assurance to the city and the ad-
joining landowners that the representations of the applicants were made
in good faith.
The effect of the protective covenant agreement is to give the city coun-
cil greater control over the development of the property which was re-
zoned.1
9 7
The court stated that the plaintiffs, as adjacent landowners,
failed to show that they were prejudiced by the agreement.198 It
believed that all of the conditions set forth in the covenant could
have been accomplished without the agreement. Furthermore, if
there-was a breach of the agreement, the property could have been
rezoned even in absence of a provision to that effect.19 9
It is difficult to determine how the court characterized the type
of zoning involved in Bucholz, i.e., whether the covenant more
closely reflected contract or conditional zoning. From the some-
what negative characterization of "bargain" present in the court's
language, one might conclude that a conditional arrangement
seemed more acceptable to the court. Indeed, the "control" ele-
ment noted by the court would appear to evidence the dangers be-
lieved to be inherent in contract zoning. This is supported by the
court's assertion that the covenant agreement merely gave "assur-
ance" to the city. Nevertheless, the court's concession that "in-
ducement" existed would tend to support the contrary conclusion.
ping center without cost to the city, and that a portion of the land would be
maintained as a buffer zone.
196. Id. at 874, 120 N.W.2d at 277.
197. Id. at 873-74, 120 N.W.2d at 277.
198. Id. at 874, 120 N.W.2d at 278.
199. Id.
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In the final analysis, the court's approach is a "classic hedge, '200
and stands only for the proposition that, in at least some circum-
stances, contract or conditional zoning will be upheld in Ne-
braska.20
IV. CONCLUSION
Avenues of relief from restrictive zoning must reflect a proper
balance between interests. One interest, important to both society
and the individual property owner, is the assurance that property
will not lie idle. On the other hand, all citizens benefit by the uni-
versal interest in the public health, safety, and welfare as reflected
in zoning legislation which often restricts the use of property. The
variance procedure would appear to recognize these interests and
allow for such a balancing process. However, due to a lack of
clearly understandable, distinct and consistent standards for cases
involving requests for a variance, these interests might be lost in
the shuffle. This problem is exacerbated by the almost blind defer-
ence afforded the board's determination on review. One attempt at
alleviating this problem might involve a more comprehensive legis-
lative determination of criteria relevant to the "unnecessary hard-
ship" and "practical difficulties" standards for all classes of cities.
A similar kind of legislative determination would be helpful in
the area of rezoning. Such action should include delineation of a
set of factors which, in the judgment of the legislature, might con-
stitute sufficiently "changed" conditions. Hopefully, this might re-
duce the amount of arbitrary and discriminatory rezoning
legislation. Finally, the expanded use of contract or conditional
zoning might prompt a more controlled atmosphere-one in which
the private property owner may be able to put his land to its most
efficient use while allowing the local governing body to maintain
the public welfare at the lowest dollar cost. What is needed in re-
gard to contract and conditional zoning is a thorough examination
by either the legislature or the courts. An explicit analysis of the
range of acceptable activity in this area would be a good starting
point.
Thomas Sattler '80
200. Comment, supra note 164, at 95.
201. See note 174 supra.
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